Consciousness

Consciousness is the state of having subjective experience or awareness. It includes the felt quality of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and perceptions.

Phenomenal consciousness: The felt, subjective character of experience, such as what pain or seeing red is like. It names the experiential aspect central to this concept.
Global neuronal workspace: A theory that conscious access occurs when information is widely broadcast across specialized brain systems. It explains reportable awareness through large-scale sharing of information.
Binocular rivalry: A perceptual phenomenon in which incompatible images presented to the two eyes alternate in awareness. The stimulus remains stable while conscious visual content changes.
Hard problem of consciousness: The problem of explaining why physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience. It frames the gap between explaining brain functions and explaining felt experience.
Access consciousness: The availability of information for reasoning, verbal report, and deliberate control of action. It distinguishes usable mental information from experience itself.
Integrated information theory: A theory that associates consciousness with the quantity and structure of integrated causal information in a system. It proposes a measure of experience based on a system’s intrinsic causal organization.
Blindsight: The ability to respond to visual stimuli without reported visual awareness, often after damage to visual cortex. It shows that visual discrimination can persist without ordinary visual experience.
Explanatory gap: The apparent gap between physical accounts of the brain and explanations of subjective experience. It names the challenge that persists even when neural functions are described.
Self-awareness: Awareness of oneself as an individual, including one’s states, traits, or actions. It is a form of awareness directed toward the experiencing subject.
Recurrent processing theory: A theory that links visual consciousness to recurrent feedback processing within sensory cortex. It locates a possible basis of experience in feedback, not merely feedforward processing.

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