Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism is the view that physical processes cause mental events, but mental events do not cause physical events. It treats consciousness as a real but causally powerless byproduct of bodily activity.

Causal closure of the physical: The principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. If physical causes are sufficient, mental events seem unable to alter bodily outcomes.
Qualia: The subjective qualities of conscious experiences, such as how red looks or pain feels. Qualia are the mental events epiphenomenalism treats as effects rather than causes.
Mind–body dualism: The family of views that distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena. Epiphenomenalism is a dualist position that denies interaction in one causal direction.
Thomas Henry Huxley: An English biologist who argued that consciousness accompanies brain activity without directing bodily action. Huxley used the steam-whistle analogy to defend a prominent form of epiphenomenalism.
Knowledge argument: An argument that complete physical knowledge may omit knowledge of what an experience is like. It challenges whether a physical account can explain the subjective events epiphenomenalism leaves causally idle.
Mental causation: The question of whether mental states cause actions or other physical events. Epiphenomenalism denies the causal influence that mental causation attributes to mind.
Mind–body problem: The philosophical problem of how mental phenomena relate to bodies and physical processes. Epiphenomenalism is one proposed account of the relation between mind and body.
Property dualism: The view that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, even if substances are physical. Epiphenomenalism is commonly framed as a property-dualist account of consciousness.
The consciousness of brutes: Thomas Henry Huxley's 1874 essay arguing that animal consciousness does not control bodily behavior. This essay presents Huxley's influential argument for consciousness as a byproduct of nervous activity.
Evolutionary argument against epiphenomenalism: An argument that consciousness would be difficult to explain by natural selection if it has no effects on behavior. Causal inertness raises the question of why conscious experience evolved alongside useful behavior.

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