Intention
A mental state that represents an action as something an agent plans or aims to do. It can guide conduct without guaranteeing that the action occurs.
Practical reasoning: Reasoning about what to do, often by weighing goals, beliefs, and available means. It explains how an aim can become a settled plan for action.
Propositional attitude: A mental relation to a proposition, such as believing, hoping, or desiring that it is true. Intentions are often analyzed as attitudes toward propositions describing actions.
Intention-in-action: An intention that guides an agent while carrying out an action. It contrasts with intentions formed earlier to perform an action later.
Elizabeth Anscombe: A British philosopher whose work on action and practical knowledge shaped twentieth-century philosophy. Her book Intention made the concept central to modern action theory.
Intention (criminal law): A mental element in criminal law concerning whether a person meant to bring about, or knew of, a result. Legal responsibility often turns on what result an actor intended.
Planning: The process of organizing actions and resources to achieve a goal. Intentions often preserve plans that organize action across time.
Agency: The capacity to act and bring about effects through one's own conduct. Intentions matter because they help explain conduct as an agent's own.
Prior intention: An intention formed before the time at which its intended action is to be performed. It can persist as a plan without continuously guiding the action itself.
Donald Davidson: An American philosopher known for influential work on action, mind, language, and interpretation. His account of reasons as causes reshaped debates about intentional action.
Doctrine of double effect: An ethical principle distinguishing intended effects from foreseen but unintended effects of an action. It makes the distinction between intention and foresight morally consequential.