Knowledge

Knowledge is a successful cognitive relation to truth, commonly distinguished from mere belief by further conditions. Philosophers disagree about which conditions make a true belief knowledge.

Belief: Belief is an attitude that treats a proposition as true. Knowledge is commonly analyzed as requiring belief in the proposition known.
Evidentialism: Evidentialism is the view that a belief's justification depends on the believer's evidence. It explains knowledge by asking whether evidence adequately supports the belief.
Knowledge-first epistemology: Knowledge-first epistemology treats knowledge as fundamental rather than defining it through belief and justification. It reverses the usual strategy of analyzing knowledge into more basic conditions.
Scientific knowledge: Scientific knowledge is knowledge produced and assessed through systematic inquiry, evidence, and criticism. It shows how standards of knowledge operate in collective empirical research.
Epistemic luck: Epistemic luck is the accidental relation between a belief's truth and the believer's grounds or method. It explains why a true, justified belief may still seem too fortunate to be knowledge.
Truth: Truth is the property of propositions or claims that correctly represent how things are. A false belief cannot count as knowledge on standard accounts.
Reliabilism: Reliabilism is the view that a belief is justified when produced by a sufficiently reliable process. It ties knowledge to dependable belief-forming methods rather than accessible reasons alone.
Skepticism: Skepticism is the view that certain kinds of knowledge are impossible or substantially more limited than commonly assumed. Skeptical arguments challenge whether ordinary claims to knowledge are justified.
Testimony: Testimony is information conveyed by another person through speech, writing, or another communicative act. Much everyday knowledge depends on whether another person's reports provide adequate grounds.
Contextualism: Epistemic contextualism holds that the truth conditions of knowledge claims vary with conversational context. It offers one explanation for shifts in how demanding knowledge ascriptions seem.

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