Mind–body problem

The philosophical question of how mental states and processes relate to the body, especially the brain, and whether mind and matter are fundamentally distinct.

Substance dualism: The view that mind and matter are distinct kinds of substance. It gives the classic answer that minds are not material bodies.
Mind–body interaction: The problem of how mental events can cause or be caused by physical events. It asks how distinct mental and bodily domains could affect one another.
Mind: The set of capacities and processes associated with thought, perception, emotion, and consciousness. The problem begins by asking how this domain relates to the body.
René Descartes: A seventeenth-century French philosopher who developed a prominent theory of mind–body substance dualism. His account made the distinction between thinking mind and extended matter a defining puzzle.
Free will: The capacity or condition of acting with control in ways relevant to responsibility. Mental causation raises questions about whether choices can control physical actions.
Idealism: The view that reality is fundamentally mental or dependent on mind. It reverses the usual priority of matter over mind.
Causal closure of the physical: The thesis that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. If physical causes are complete, mental causation needs a clear account.
Body: The physical organism, including its organs, nervous system, and bodily processes. It is the bodily side of the relation whose status the problem examines.
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia: A seventeenth-century philosopher whose correspondence with Descartes challenged his account of mind–body interaction. She pressed Descartes to explain how an unextended mind could move a body.
Personal identity: The question of what makes a person the same individual over time. Accounts of the mind affect whether identity depends on body, brain, or psychological continuity.

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