Nuclear command and control

Nuclear command and control comprises the procedures, communications, and systems used to authorize, direct, and monitor nuclear forces. It must preserve legitimate authority while preventing unauthorized or accidental use.

Nuclear launch authority: The legally and operationally defined power to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. This authority is the decision point that command-and-control procedures must protect and communicate.
United States nuclear command and control: The institutions and systems through which the United States authorizes and directs its nuclear forces. Its evolving arrangements provide a detailed national case of the broader problem.
Harry S. Truman: The 33rd president of the United States, who authorized the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His presidency established the precedent of presidential control over U.S. nuclear use.
Launch on warning: A posture in which nuclear forces may be launched after warning of an incoming attack but before impact. It compresses decision time and makes warning-system reliability central to command decisions.
Accidental nuclear war: A nuclear conflict begun unintentionally through error, miscommunication, or unintended escalation. Failures in communication or authorization can turn a false alarm into a launch decision.
Nuclear command, control, and communications: The communications and information systems that connect leaders with nuclear forces and support command decisions. These systems carry orders and status reports through the command chain.
Soviet nuclear command and control: The institutions and systems used by the Soviet Union to direct and authorize its nuclear forces. Its distinct structure shaped Cold War calculations about escalation and launch decisions.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: The 34th president of the United States, whose administration developed nuclear strategy and delegated some military authority. Delegation under his administration raised enduring questions about control during a crisis.
Launch on attack: A posture that waits for confirmation that an adversary has launched nuclear weapons before retaliating. It contrasts with launch on warning by requiring evidence of an actual attack rather than an alert.
Nuclear false alarm: A warning-system indication of nuclear attack that does not correspond to an actual attack. Leaders and operators must assess false alarms under the time pressures command systems impose.

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