Pascal's wager

Pascal's wager is a decision-theoretic argument that choosing belief in God is prudent because possible eternal happiness outweighs the finite costs of belief.

Expected utility: A decision rule that evaluates choices by averaging their possible utilities, weighted by their probabilities. The wager treats belief as the choice with greater expected payoff.
Blaise Pascal: A seventeenth-century French mathematician, physicist, and religious thinker. He formulated the wager in notes published after his death.
Evidentialism: The view that belief should be proportioned to the evidence available for a proposition. It challenges pragmatic reasons for belief when evidence is insufficient.
Pragmatic argument for theism: An argument that adopting theism is warranted by its practical benefits rather than evidence alone. Pascal's wager became the best-known example of this broader argumentative strategy.
Decision theory: The study of how agents should choose among actions under certainty, risk, or uncertainty. The wager applies choice theory to religious commitment under uncertainty.
Pensées: A collection of Blaise Pascal's notes for an unfinished defense of Christianity, published posthumously. The wager appears among its fragments on religious belief.
Doxastic voluntarism: The thesis that people can voluntarily choose what to believe. The wager may recommend belief, but critics question whether belief is directly under voluntary control.
William James: An American philosopher and psychologist known for defending the practical role of faith. His essay The Will to Believe revisits when practical stakes may justify commitment.
Infinity: A mathematical concept describing quantities without finite bound. An infinite payoff is what makes finite worldly costs seem negligible in the wager.
Jansenism: A Catholic theological movement emphasizing grace, human sinfulness, and rigorous religious practice. Pascal's religious commitments and polemics were shaped by Jansenist debates.

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