Phenomenal consciousness

Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective, felt character of experience: what it is like to see a color, feel pain, or have a thought.

Qualia: Qualia are the felt qualities of experiences, such as the redness of red or the sting of pain. They name the qualities that make experience feel a certain way.
Physicalism: Physicalism is the view that everything is physical or depends wholly on the physical. It frames the challenge of explaining felt experience within a physical account of reality.
Global neuronal workspace theory: Global neuronal workspace theory explains conscious access through information broadcast across widely distributed brain systems. It offers a neural account of how contents become globally available, while leaving their felt character debated.
Mary's room: Mary’s room is a thought experiment about a scientist who learns all physical facts about color vision without seeing color. It asks whether complete physical knowledge leaves out what seeing a color feels like.
Problem of other minds: The problem of other minds concerns how anyone can know that beings other than oneself have minds or experiences. Subjective experience is private, making its presence in others an inference rather than direct observation.
Access consciousness: Access consciousness is information being available for reasoning, report, and deliberate control. It distinguishes felt experience from information’s availability for cognitive use.
Functionalism: Functionalism characterizes mental states by their causal roles rather than by their material composition. Its account of mental function is often contrasted with the claim that felt qualities remain unexplained.
Integrated information theory: Integrated information theory proposes that consciousness corresponds to a system’s irreducible integrated information. It aims to explain experience itself through the structure and unity of a system’s causal organization.
Philosophical zombie: A philosophical zombie is a hypothetical physical and behavioral duplicate of a person that lacks conscious experience. It tests whether physical and functional facts alone guarantee phenomenal experience.
Animal consciousness: Animal consciousness is the capacity of nonhuman animals to have subjective experiences. It tests which behavioral, neural, and evolutionary evidence warrants attributing felt experience.

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