Physicalism

Physicalism is the view that everything is physical or ultimately depends on the physical. It holds that mental phenomena belong within, or depend on, the physical world.

Dualism: Dualism holds that reality includes two fundamentally distinct kinds of substance or property, commonly mental and physical. It denies physicalism’s claim that mental reality is physical or wholly dependent on the physical.
Mind–body problem: The philosophical problem of explaining how mental phenomena relate to the body and physical processes. Physicalism is a proposed solution to this central question.
Metaphysical naturalism: The view that reality contains no supernatural entities or forces beyond the natural world. Physicalism is a more specific naturalist thesis about what reality fundamentally includes.
Hard problem of consciousness: The problem of explaining why and how physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience. It asks whether a physical account can explain experience itself, not merely its functions.
Idealism: Idealism holds that mind or mental contents are fundamental to reality. It reverses physicalism’s priority by treating mind, rather than matter, as basic.
Supervenience: A relation in which one set of properties cannot vary without some variation in another set. Physicalists often use it to express how mental facts depend on physical facts.
Physical object: An object that exists in space and time and participates in physical interactions. Physicalism’s basic ontology commonly treats such objects as paradigmatically physical.
Qualia: The subjective qualitative aspects of experience, such as how pain feels or red appears. Their apparent first-person character raises doubts about whether physical descriptions capture all mental facts.
Neutral monism: Neutral monism holds that mental and physical phenomena derive from a more fundamental, nonmental and nonphysical reality. It offers a monist alternative without identifying the fundamental basis as physical.
Realization (philosophy): A relation in which a higher-level property or kind is instantiated by a lower-level structure or process. It explains how mental states can be physically implemented without being identical across species.

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