Knowra The Structure of Scientific Revolutions The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn’s 1962 book argues that scientific fields develop through periods of normal science interrupted by revolutions that replace shared paradigms.
Paradigm shift : A major change in a field’s guiding framework, standards, and exemplary problems. Kuhn made this change central to his account of scientific revolutions.
Scientific paradigm : A shared framework of theories, methods, standards, and examples guiding research in a scientific community. Kuhn uses paradigms to explain how communities coordinate normal research.
Thomas S. Kuhn : An American historian and philosopher of science whose work reshaped debates about scientific change. He wrote and later revised the book’s account of paradigms and revolutions.
Philosophy of science : The branch of philosophy that examines scientific methods, knowledge, explanation, and progress. The book became a central work in this field’s debates about scientific change.
Karl Popper : An Austrian-British philosopher who argued that scientific theories should be exposed to potential falsification. Popper’s emphasis on constant testing contrasts with Kuhn’s account of routine puzzle-solving.
Normal science : Research conducted within an accepted paradigm, chiefly solving puzzles the paradigm defines. It describes the stable periods that revolutions interrupt.
Scientific community : A group of researchers sharing training, standards, and practices within a field. For Kuhn, scientific change is carried by communities, not isolated theories alone.
The Copernican Revolution : The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century transformation from geocentric astronomy toward a Sun-centered system. Kuhn had studied this historical episode before formulating his account of revolutions.
Scientific progress : The development of scientific knowledge through changing explanations, methods, and evidence. Kuhn questioned whether progress is always a steady accumulation of truths.
Falsifiability : The property of a claim that could, in principle, be contradicted by an observation or experiment. Popper treated falsifiability as a criterion for science, unlike Kuhn’s historical focus on paradigms.
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