Linked from

The 33 pages that link to Collective action problem, each with the reason it gives.

• Collective actionRelated: It captures the tension between shared gains and individual incentives that shapes collective action.

• Public goodsNarrower topic: Public-good provision is a central case: each person may prefer others to bear the cost.

• Principal–agent problemCompared with: It concerns coordination among principals, rather than divergence between principal and agent.

• LobbyingRelated: Small, concentrated groups often organize more readily than large publics with diffuse interests.

• ConfederationRelated: Sovereign members may withhold resources or cooperation from shared confederal goals.

• Institutional economicsRelated: Institutions can organize cooperation and prevent free-riding.

• CorruptionRelated: It explains why corruption can persist when people expect others to participate.

• Methodological individualismRelated: It shows how individual incentives can produce outcomes no participant intends.

• Tragedy of the commonsNarrower topic: The resource loss is a collective failure produced by separate choices.

• BriberyRelated: When bribery is widespread, refusing to pay can seem costly even to people who oppose it.

• Interest groupRelated: It explains why groups struggle to recruit members for benefits that nonmembers also receive.

• DecentralizationRelated: Independent decision centers can struggle to coordinate when their interests or actions diverge.

• Public choiceNarrower topic: It helps explain why concentrated groups organize more readily than diffuse publics.

• Moral motivationRelated: Moral commitment can help sustain cooperation when self-interest favors free riding.

• IntergovernmentalismNarrower topic: Governments may resist cooperation even when coordinated action would benefit them collectively.

• Public goods gameNarrower topic: The game formalizes this broader problem through individual contribution choices.

• Political powerRelated: It helps explain why widely shared interests may wield less power than organized minorities.

• IncentiveRelated: Misaligned private and shared incentives can leave mutually beneficial cooperation unrealized.

• Political institutionRelated: Institutions can coordinate contributions and restrain free-riding in political cooperation.

• Social dilemmaNarrower topic: It is the broader coordination challenge that social dilemmas instantiate.

• Protection racketRelated: Victims may struggle to resist together when each fears retaliation for refusing alone.

• Ethnic conflictRelated: It helps explain how leaders recruit participants and sustain costly collective violence.

• Garrett HardinNarrower topic: The commons dilemma is one specific form of this broader coordination problem.

• Advocacy groupRelated: Groups must overcome free riding to mobilize supporters and maintain campaigns.

• Anti-corruptionRelated: This model explains why corruption can persist even when most people oppose it.

• NIMBYRelated: Residents can coordinate to block a project even when its broader benefits are widely shared.

• Housing cooperativeRelated: Shared maintenance can falter when members benefit from collective effort but avoid its costs.

• International relations theoryRelated: It helps explain why states may fail to provide shared goods or uphold common agreements.

• Iron law of oligarchyRelated: The costs of participation make members less able to monitor leaders continuously.

• Constitutional economicsRelated: Constitutional rules can change incentives that otherwise obstruct collective provision.

• AgorismRelated: Building durable alternatives requires coordination even when participants favor voluntary, decentralized exchange.

• Anti-statismRelated: It tests whether voluntary cooperation can reliably provide services often assigned to states.

• ApoliticismRelated: Disengagement can weaken shared efforts even when people would benefit from their success.