Deterrence theory

Deterrence theory holds that a credible threat of retaliation can discourage an adversary from taking an unwanted action. Its logic depends on the adversary expecting that the costs of acting will outweigh the benefits.

Credible threat: A threat whose target has reason to believe it will be carried out if its stated conditions are met. A threat deters only when an adversary expects retaliation to follow the prohibited action.
Rational choice theory: An approach that explains choices as attempts to select actions that best serve an actor's preferences under constraints. Deterrence models often assume adversaries compare expected costs and benefits.
Nuclear deterrence: The use of threatened nuclear retaliation to discourage an adversary from attacking or taking another prohibited action. It is the best-known application, with the scale of retaliation shaping strategic calculations.
Compellence: A strategy that uses threats or force to make an adversary change an existing course of action. Unlike deterrence, compellence seeks to make an adversary act rather than refrain.
Thomas Schelling: An American economist and strategist whose work analyzed bargaining, threats, and coercion in international conflict. His analysis of credible threats and strategic bargaining shaped modern deterrence theory.
Deterrence by punishment: A strategy that discourages an action by threatening to impose costs after it occurs. Retaliation makes the expected cost of acting central to the theory's logic.
Game theory: The mathematical study of strategic situations in which each actor's outcome depends on others' choices. Deterrence is a strategic interaction in which each side anticipates the other's response.
Mutual assured destruction: A condition in which opposing nuclear powers can each inflict unacceptable destruction even after absorbing a first strike. The prospect of mutual devastation became a defining form of nuclear deterrence.
Appeasement: A policy of making concessions to an adversary in an effort to avoid conflict. It seeks to reduce conflict through concessions rather than threatened retaliation.
Bernard Brodie: An American military strategist who argued that nuclear weapons made preventing war more important than winning it. His early nuclear strategy writing helped define deterrence as a central purpose of military power.

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