G. E. Moore

G. E. Moore (1873–1958) was a British philosopher whose work in ethics and epistemology defended the objectivity of moral value and the reliability of common-sense knowledge.

Intrinsic value: The value something has in itself, rather than through its effects or usefulness. Moore treated intrinsic value as the central question of ethics.
Principia Ethica: Moore’s 1903 book arguing that goodness is simple, indefinable, and a subject of substantive ethical inquiry. It presents the ethical arguments that made Moore influential.
Bertrand Russell: A British philosopher, logician, and social critic who helped establish analytic philosophy. Russell was Moore’s Cambridge contemporary and philosophical collaborator before their views diverged.
Analytic philosophy: A philosophical tradition emphasizing clarity, logical analysis, and close attention to language. Moore helped establish its early British form through precise arguments and conceptual distinctions.
Ethical naturalism: The view that moral properties or facts are reducible to natural properties or facts. Moore argued that no natural property successfully defines goodness.
Naturalistic fallacy: The alleged mistake of defining goodness in terms of natural properties such as pleasure or desire. Moore used this charge to challenge naturalistic definitions of moral goodness.
Proof of an External World: Moore’s argument that he had two hands and that their existence proved an external world. The argument turns common-sense certainty into a direct challenge to idealism and skepticism.
Ludwig Wittgenstein: An Austrian-British philosopher whose work transformed twentieth-century philosophy of language and mind. Wittgenstein’s later reflections on certainty engaged Moore’s common-sense claims.
Metaethics: The study of the meaning, status, and foundations of moral judgments. Moore’s questions about goodness and moral knowledge became central metaethical problems.
Hedonism: The ethical view that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good or the ultimate basis of value. Moore challenged the reduction of goodness to pleasure in his critique of ethical theories.

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