Identity theory

Identity theory holds that mental states are identical with physical states of the brain. It treats this as a claim of literal sameness, not merely correlation or causal interaction.

Mind–body problem: The philosophical problem of how mental phenomena relate to bodies and physical processes. Identity theory is one proposed answer to this broader problem.
Type identity theory: The view that each mental state kind is identical with a physical state kind. It gives the strongest, kind-by-kind version of the theory.
Ullin Place: An English philosopher who defended the identity of conscious experiences with brain processes. His 1956 paper helped launch the modern identity theory of mind.
Substance dualism: The view that mind and matter are distinct kinds of substance. Identity theory rejects the separate mental substance this view posits.
Mental state: A condition of a mind, such as a belief, sensation, desire, or experience. Identity theory claims that mental states are brain states.
Token identity theory: The view that each particular mental event is a particular physical event, without requiring matching kinds. It preserves event identity while allowing different brains to realize a mental kind differently.
J. J. C. Smart: An Australian philosopher who argued that sensations are brain processes. His 1959 defense made the identity theory a prominent form of materialism.
Property dualism: The view that mental properties are nonphysical, even if only physical substances exist. It accepts physical subjects while denying that mental properties are brain properties.
Physicalism: The view that everything is physical or depends ultimately on the physical. Identity theory is a specific form of physicalism about the mind.
Multiple realizability: The possibility that one mental or functional kind can be realized by different physical kinds. It challenges one-to-one identities between mental kinds and brain kinds.

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