Linked from

The 13 pages that link to Incentive compatibility, each with the reason it gives.

• Principal–agent problemRelated: A well-designed arrangement makes the agent’s preferred action serve the principal’s goal.

• Mechanism designRelated: Mechanisms often aim to make truthful reporting each participant’s best strategy.

• Free-rider problemRelated: Provision mechanisms must make contributing consistent with participants’ incentives.

• Market designRelated: Truthful reporting can make an allocation rule workable despite private information.

• Leonid HurwiczRelated: Hurwicz’s framework asks whether an institution can achieve its goal when participants have reasons to misrepresent information.

• Participatory economicsRelated: Effort-based remuneration and proposal reporting must resist strategic misrepresentation.

• Experimental economicsRelated: Experiments vary incentives to test whether participants reveal information or act strategically.

• Eric MaskinRelated: Implementation depends on whether the rules make strategic deviations unprofitable.

• Roger MyersonRelated: Mechanisms must make truthful or intended behavior worthwhile despite private information.

• Bengt HolmströmRelated: Holmström’s models ask how contracts can make desired behavior privately worthwhile.

• William VickreyRelated: Vickrey’s auction designs made truthful bidding a strategically sound choice.

• James MirrleesRelated: Tax schedules must make workers’ chosen effort and reported types consistent with their incentives.