Linked from

The 51 pages that link to Information asymmetry, each with the reason it gives.

• ExternalityCompared with: It distorts exchange through hidden information rather than effects on uninvolved parties.

• Principal–agent problemNarrower topic: The principal cannot fully judge the agent’s knowledge, actions, or effort.

• Market failureRelated: Hidden information can prevent mutually beneficial trades or distort their terms.

• DeterrenceRelated: Opponents often cannot know one another’s resolve, capabilities, or intentions.

• Mechanism designRelated: Unequal information is the central constraint that mechanisms are built to address.

• Moral hazardNarrower topic: The protected party often knows more about its own risk-taking than the party bearing the cost.

• Regulatory captureRelated: Regulators often depend on firms for technical knowledge, giving those firms influence over what rules seem feasible.

• NegotiationRelated: Unequal knowledge can distort offers and make claims difficult to assess.

• Transaction CostRelated: Unequal information can make it costly to assess quality and negotiate terms.

• Censorship in ChinaRelated: Restrictions can leave the public and officials with sharply unequal access to facts.

• Kenneth ArrowRelated: Arrow analyzed how unequal information can disrupt otherwise efficient markets.

• PokerNarrower topic: Players make wagers without seeing opponents’ private cards.

• Price discriminationRelated: Buyers’ private information makes their willingness to pay difficult for sellers to observe.

• Deterrence theoryRelated: Adversaries may misjudge each other's resolve or military capacity.

• Adverse selectionNarrower topic: Insurers know less than applicants about their individual risks.

• Price mechanismRelated: Prices may not convey reliable information when market participants possess unequal knowledge.

• CrowdfundingRelated: Organizers often know more about a project’s prospects than contributors can verify.

• Efficient-market hypothesisRelated: The strong-form claim raises the question of whether prices can incorporate information unavailable to ordinary investors.

• Due diligenceRelated: Diligence reduces information gaps between parties without eliminating them.

• Fog of warNarrower topic: Opposing forces rarely share the same picture of the conflict.

• Resource allocationRelated: Unequal information can distort who receives resources and whether they reach suitable uses.

• Bargaining powerRelated: Private knowledge can strengthen one side’s position or distort the terms.

• Information economicsBroader topic: Unequal knowledge is the central condition behind many information-economics problems.

• Price discoveryRelated: Uneven information changes which orders traders submit and what prices they accept.

• Joseph StiglitzNarrower topic: This is the central problem underlying several theories that earned Stiglitz the economics Nobel.

• Economic efficiencyRelated: Unequal information can prevent markets from reaching outcomes that would be efficient with full information.

• BargainingRelated: Private information can distort offers and make mutually beneficial terms harder to identify.

• BluffingNarrower topic: Bluffing exploits gaps between what one party knows and what another can observe.

• Special libraryRelated: Specialized research services can reduce information gaps within an organization or profession.

• Financial economicsRelated: Unequal information can alter trading, financing, and market outcomes.

• Market efficiencyRelated: Unequal information can distort choices, prices, and the allocation of resources.

• Trade (commerce)Related: Unequal knowledge can distort prices and undermine trust in traded goods.

• George AkerlofNarrower topic: The lemons problem is a specific case of buyers and sellers knowing different things.

• George StiglerCompared with: Stigler emphasized costly information search, complementing later focus on unequal information between parties.

• Modigliani–Miller theoremRelated: Unequal information can make financing choices affect how investors assess a firm.

• Voluntary exchangeRelated: Unequal information can undermine informed consent even when both parties formally agree.

• Michael SpenceNarrower topic: The signaling model addresses markets where one side knows more than the other.

• John HarsanyiRelated: His central problem was how strategic choices change when players hold private information.

• StrategoNarrower topic: Each player knows their own setup but must infer the opponent’s concealed ranks.

• Bengt HolmströmNarrower topic: Unequal information is the setting for many of Holmström’s contract-theory results.

• Jean TiroleRelated: Tirole analyzes how hidden information shapes contracts between firms, governments, and consumers.

• Social deduction gameNarrower topic: Unequal knowledge gives players distinct reasons to make or conceal claims.

• William VickreyRelated: His work showed how economic rules can address informational imbalances.

• DistrustRelated: Unequal knowledge makes it harder to verify claims and can intensify distrust.

• James MirrleesNarrower topic: Private information about ability is the central constraint in Mirrlees’s taxation model.

• Managerial economicsRelated: Unequal information can alter pricing, contracting, hiring, and product-quality decisions.

• AgnotologyRelated: Unequal access can make ignorance systematic rather than accidental.

• Curse of knowledgeNarrower topic: The bias becomes consequential when one party’s information advantage shapes communication or decisions.

• Employment agencyRelated: Agencies can reduce uncertainty about candidates and vacancies, while holding information of their own.

• Fisher separation theoremCompared with: Unequal information can make financing choices affect project selection and firm value.