Linked from

The 49 pages that link to Nash equilibrium, each with the reason it gives.

• John von NeumannCompared with: Nash equilibrium extends strategic analysis beyond the two-player zero-sum games central to von Neumann’s minimax result.

• Lloyd ShapleyCompared with: Nash equilibrium concerns strategic stability, while Shapley’s value allocates cooperative gains.

• MinimaxCompared with: Minimax computes optimal play in zero-sum settings; Nash equilibrium also covers general strategic interactions.

• Incentive compatibilityCompared with: Compatibility can require truthful strategies to be optimal, but Nash equilibrium alone does not specify truthfulness.

• Market equilibriumCompared with: Strategic equilibrium need not mean that buyers’ purchases equal sellers’ sales.

• Subgame perfect equilibriumCompared with: Nash equilibrium can permit noncredible off-path plans that subgame perfection rules out.

• Theory of Games and Economic BehaviorCompared with: This later solution concept became central to noncooperative games, unlike the book’s main framework.

• Walrasian equilibriumCompared with: It models strategic interaction, whereas Walrasian equilibrium assumes agents take prices as given.

• Cooperative game theoryCompared with: It evaluates individual deviations, while cooperative stability considers coalition deviations.

• Dominant strategyCompared with: A dominant strategy is optimal against every choice; Nash equilibrium requires optimality only against the choices actually played.