Linked from

The 54 pages that link to Pareto efficiency, each with the reason it gives.

• Cost–benefit analysisRelated: A positive net benefit does not establish that every person gains.

• Deadweight lossRelated: Foregone mutually beneficial trades indicate an avoidable failure of this efficiency criterion.

• Nash equilibriumCompared with: A Nash equilibrium may be Pareto inefficient, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates.

• Market failureNarrower topic: It is a standard benchmark for judging whether a market allocation leaves feasible improvements.

• Consumer surplusRelated: Positive consumer surplus alone does not establish that an allocation is Pareto efficient.

• Welfare economicsRelated: It supplies a central, deliberately limited test of whether an allocation leaves gains unrealized.

• Mechanism designRelated: Efficiency is one common benchmark for judging the outcomes a mechanism produces.

• Neoclassical economicsRelated: This criterion became a central standard for evaluating market allocations.

• Social welfare functionRelated: A widely used condition requires social rankings to respect unanimous welfare improvements.

• Kenneth ArrowRelated: Arrow’s welfare results use this efficiency criterion, which does not settle questions of fairness.

• Social choice theoryRelated: It is a standard criterion for judging collective decisions.

• Amartya SenRelated: Sen showed that minimal respect for individual preferences can conflict with rights and freedom.

• General equilibrium theoryRelated: Efficiency is a key criterion for evaluating general-equilibrium allocations.

• Producer surplusRelated: Surplus-maximizing trade is connected to efficiency under standard competitive-market assumptions.

• Preference relationRelated: Welfare comparisons depend on how individual preferences rank feasible outcomes.

• Prisoner's dilemmaRelated: Mutual cooperation can Pareto-dominate mutual defection in the dilemma.

• Objective functionCompared with: With conflicting objectives, solutions may be compared by dominance rather than one score.

• Arrow's impossibility theoremBroader topic: This unanimity requirement is one of the theorem's jointly incompatible conditions.

• Léon WalrasRelated: Pareto developed a major efficiency criterion within the Lausanne tradition Walras established.

• Ordinal utilityRelated: Pareto comparisons can use ordinal preferences without comparing utility magnitudes across people.

• Coase theoremRelated: The theorem’s central result concerns efficient outcomes, not equal or otherwise preferred distributions.

• Incentive compatibilityCompared with: It evaluates outcomes, whereas incentive compatibility evaluates participants' strategic choices.

• Resource allocationCompared with: Efficiency alone does not determine whether an allocation is fair.

• Vilfredo ParetoBroader topic: This welfare criterion grew from Pareto’s analysis of economic allocation.

• Stable marriage problemCompared with: A stable matching need not be the only efficient outcome, and stability is a different criterion.

• First welfare theoremBroader topic: This is the efficiency property the theorem guarantees for competitive equilibria.

• Law and economicsRelated: It is one benchmark for judging whether a legal arrangement permits avoidable gains.

• Market designRelated: It is one standard for judging whether an allocation wastes potential gains.

• Zero-sum gameRelated: Zero-sum settings constrain joint improvement differently from games with shared gains.

• Second welfare theoremNarrower topic: The theorem’s target allocations are exactly those that satisfy this efficiency criterion.

• Allocative efficiencyRelated: Competitive equilibrium can satisfy this efficiency criterion, though it does not settle questions of fairness.

• Economic efficiencyBroader topic: It formalizes one prominent criterion for judging whether an allocation leaves avoidable gains unrealized.

• Kaldor–Hicks efficiencyCompared with: Unlike Pareto improvement, Kaldor–Hicks permits changes that leave some people worse off.

• Production–possibility frontierRelated: Productive efficiency on the frontier does not by itself guarantee economy-wide Pareto efficiency.

• Stable matchingCompared with: A stable matching need not be Pareto efficient under every model of preferences and feasible assignments.

• Walrasian equilibriumRelated: Welfare theorems connect this criterion to competitive equilibrium under specified assumptions.

• Dominant strategyCompared with: A dominant choice need not produce a Pareto-efficient outcome, as the prisoner's dilemma shows.

• Minimal elementRelated: Efficient outcomes are minimal under the order that compares outcomes by all objectives.

• BargainingRelated: An agreement may divide gains differently while still being efficient in this sense.

• Tjalling KoopmansRelated: Efficiency criteria help identify which resource allocations activity analysis deems worthwhile.

• Arthur Cecil PigouRelated: This efficiency criterion helps frame welfare judgments that Pigou’s approach sought to improve.

• Economic equilibriumCompared with: Equilibrium describes compatible plans; Pareto efficiency evaluates the resulting allocation.

• Market efficiencyRelated: Economists use this criterion to assess whether an allocation leaves mutually beneficial changes unrealized.

• Gérard DebreuRelated: Competitive equilibrium allocations can be assessed using this efficiency criterion.

• Gibbard–Satterthwaite theoremRelated: Related impossibility results combine preference-respecting conditions with non-dictatorship.

• Invisible handRelated: It gives a precise efficiency criterion related to, but narrower than, social benefit.

• Order theoryRelated: Multiple objectives induce partial orders, making efficiency an order-theoretic idea.

• Voluntary exchangeRelated: Under restrictive assumptions, mutually beneficial trades can move an allocation toward Pareto efficiency.

• Public economicsRelated: It supplies an efficiency benchmark, though it does not determine whether an outcome is fair.

• Maurice AllaisRelated: Allais studied the conditions under which market allocation can achieve this welfare benchmark.