Linked from

The 46 pages that link to Principal–agent problem, each with the reason it gives.

• Corporate governanceRelated: Separation between ownership and management creates a central governance challenge.

• Civil-military relationsRelated: Civilian leaders delegate expertise and force to military agents but cannot monitor every decision.

• Mechanism designRelated: Contracts address hidden effort and information between principals and agents.

• Moral hazardRelated: Insurers and lenders cannot always observe how policyholders or borrowers behave after an agreement.

• PatronageRelated: Patrons delegate tasks to clients but cannot fully control how those clients act.

• Public–private partnershipRelated: Private operators may know more about costs and effort than the public authority overseeing them.

• Conflict of interestRelated: It explains why delegated decision-making creates opportunities for private interests to distort professional judgment.

• State-owned enterpriseRelated: Citizens and governments may struggle to ensure managers act in the public owner's interests.

• Representative democracyRelated: Elected officials may pursue priorities that diverge from the citizens who authorize them.

• Goodhart's lawRelated: The law becomes acute when principals use metrics to control agents whose goals differ.

• Institutional economicsRelated: Rules and monitoring arrangements address conflicts created by delegated decisions.

• CentralizationRelated: Central officials may struggle to monitor distant administrators who implement their policies.

• Political scienceRelated: Delegation creates monitoring problems between voters, representatives, and administrators.

• DelegationRelated: Delegating decisions creates room for goals and information to diverge.

• BriberyRelated: A bribe exploits the gap between an official’s private incentives and public duties.

• Democratic accountabilityRelated: Citizens delegate authority to officials but cannot directly observe every decision.

• Proxy warRelated: Local allies can pursue their own agendas, making sponsor control costly and uncertain.

• DecentralizationRelated: Delegated authority can make it harder for those granting power to monitor its use.

• Legislative oversightRelated: Oversight addresses the information gap between legislators and executive administrators.

• Public ownershipRelated: Public owners must oversee managers whose operational knowledge and incentives may diverge from public goals.

• Power imbalanceRelated: Delegated authority can let decision-makers act with limited oversight.

• Public choiceRelated: Voters delegate authority to officials whose decisions they cannot fully monitor.

• Incentive compatibilityRelated: Contracts address whether an agent will choose the action the principal wants.

• Profit maximizationRelated: Managers may pursue goals that diverge from owners' profit-maximizing interests.

• Efficiency wageRelated: Employers use wage premiums to influence workers whose effort they cannot perfectly observe.

• Joseph StiglitzRelated: Stiglitz’s information economics explains why contracts cannot always align agents’ incentives.

• Bayesian gameRelated: Private information about an agent’s type can shape contracts and incentives.

• Chain of commandRelated: Each delegation link can separate decision-makers from the goals they are meant to serve.

• IncentiveRelated: Incentives are used to align an agent's actions with a principal's goals.

• Political institutionRelated: Delegating authority creates monitoring and accountability challenges inside political institutions.

• Executive compensationRelated: Shareholders delegate company decisions to executives whose motives may not match their own.

• Private military companyRelated: Clients may struggle to monitor contractors whose incentives and operational knowledge differ from their own.

• The Afghanistan PapersRelated: U.S. officials depended on local partners whose incentives and capabilities were difficult to assess.

• Anti-corruptionRelated: This model explains corruption as an agent exploiting weak monitoring by principals.

• Corporate crimeRelated: Managers may pursue personal rewards through conduct that exposes a company to criminal liability.

• Business economicsRelated: Managers and owners may favor different risks, investments, or measures of business performance.

• Jean TiroleRelated: It captures the incentive problem behind regulation and many of Tirole’s contract models.

• Oliver HartRelated: Hart’s models likewise examine how contractual arrangements shape incentives between parties.

• Socialist self-managementRelated: Elected managers may gain influence or pursue interests distinct from the workers who choose them.

• CustomerRelated: A purchasing agent may choose on behalf of a customer organization with different interests.

• Health Care Economics and OrganizationsRelated: Patients rely on clinicians to choose care despite unequal expertise and potentially misaligned incentives.

• Peter principleRelated: Promotion decisions can reflect incentives and information gaps between employees and organizations.

• Yes MinisterRelated: Hacker depends on officials whose knowledge and incentives he cannot fully monitor.