Knowra Repeated game Repeated game A strategic interaction in which the same game is played across multiple rounds. Players may condition their current actions on past play, linking present incentives to future outcomes.
Folk theorem (game theory) : A family of results showing that many feasible payoff outcomes can be sustained as equilibria in infinitely repeated games. It describes how patience and credible future responses can support cooperation.
Normal-form game : A representation of a strategic interaction listing players, available actions, and payoffs for each action combination. Each round can be specified as a normal-form game.
Iterated prisoner's dilemma : A prisoner's dilemma played repeatedly, with strategies potentially depending on earlier choices. It is the canonical setting for studying cooperation sustained by future interactions.
One-shot game : A strategic interaction played once, without future rounds in which actions can be rewarded or punished. It removes the future incentives that distinguish repeated interaction.
Trigger strategy : A strategy that changes behavior after a specified event, often switching to punishment after a defection. It makes future punishment contingent on a player's current deviation.
Nash equilibrium : A strategy profile in which no player can gain by changing their strategy alone. The one-shot equilibrium provides a baseline for outcomes repetition may alter.
Repeated public goods game : A public goods game played in multiple rounds, allowing contributions and responses to evolve over time. It models how groups maintain or lose cooperation across recurring contributions.
Finite repeated game : A game played a known, limited number of times, with a final round. A fixed endpoint can undermine cooperation as the last round approaches.
Tit for tat : A strategy that begins with cooperation and then copies the opponent's previous action. It illustrates how reciprocity can govern play across rounds.
Game tree : A diagram of a sequential game showing decision points, available actions, and resulting outcomes. A repeated interaction can be represented as a tree of histories and future choices.
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