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The 12 pages that link to Repeated game, each with the reason it gives.

• ReciprocityNarrower topic: Future encounters can make returning benefits worthwhile even when immediate defection pays.

• Reciprocal altruismRelated: Repeated encounters create opportunities for delayed repayment and retaliation.

• Prisoner's dilemmaCompared with: Future consequences can make cooperation sustainable, unlike the standard one-shot setup.

• ReputationRelated: The prospect of future interactions makes reputation valuable for sustaining cooperation.

• Subgame perfect equilibriumRelated: Repeated-game analysis uses subgame perfection to test whether strategies remain optimal after every history.

• Social dilemmaRelated: Future rewards and retaliation can make cooperation rational where a one-time interaction would not.

• Extensive-form gameBroader topic: Its extensive form makes the order of rounds and observed histories explicit.

• Protection racketRelated: Recurring payments depend on preserving leverage across repeated encounters.

• Robert AumannBroader topic: Repeated interaction is the setting of Aumann’s best-known cooperation results.

• Anatol RapoportRelated: Repeated interaction explains how reciprocal strategies can sustain cooperation in Rapoport’s models.

• Folk theoremNarrower topic: Folk theorems characterize outcomes that repeated play can sustain.

• Game (game theory)Related: Repeated interaction can make cooperation sustainable despite short-term incentives.