Linked from

The 25 pages that link to Social welfare function, each with the reason it gives.

• Pareto efficiencyRelated: It can rank efficient outcomes that Pareto comparisons leave incomparable.

• Welfare economicsRelated: It makes explicit how individual outcomes are combined into a judgment about society.

• UtilityNarrower topic: Individual utility may be an input, but social evaluation requires choices about aggregation.

• Neoclassical economicsRelated: It exposes the value judgments needed to move from individual preferences to social evaluation.

• Social choice theoryRelated: It formalizes the central task of turning many rankings into one.

• Utility functionCompared with: It ranks social outcomes rather than one consumer's bundles.

• Objective functionRelated: It turns competing social priorities into an objective for policy analysis.

• Arrow's impossibility theoremNarrower topic: Arrow's theorem applies to this kind of rule and specifies the conditions it cannot jointly satisfy.

• Ordinal utilityRelated: Aggregation exposes the limits of individual ordinal rankings for comparing social outcomes.

• EconomicsRelated: It makes explicit the value judgments behind assessing whether an economic outcome is better.

• Resource allocationRelated: It formalizes how competing allocations can be compared using judgments about collective welfare.

• Law and economicsRelated: It makes explicit whose welfare counts when legal policies are compared.

• Second welfare theoremRelated: It can guide the choice among efficient allocations before redistribution is designed.

• Allocative efficiencyRelated: The meaning of maximizing social welfare depends on how individual outcomes are evaluated collectively.

• Economic efficiencyRelated: Efficiency judgments need a welfare criterion when comparing outcomes that affect people differently.

• Kaldor–Hicks efficiencyRelated: Kaldor–Hicks does not itself specify how aggregate welfare should be ranked.

• Arthur Cecil PigouRelated: Pigou’s welfare analysis asks how economic changes affect aggregate welfare.

• Market efficiencyRelated: Efficiency alone cannot rank outcomes without choices about how welfare is aggregated.

• Gibbard–Satterthwaite theoremCompared with: Unlike a social choice function, it returns a ranking, the setting of Arrow's related theorem.

• Public economicsRelated: Policy comparisons require an explicit account of how gains and losses across people count.

• Maurice AllaisRelated: Allais examined how economic organization and allocation relate to collective welfare.

• Fundamental theorems of welfare economicsRelated: The theorems do not select among efficient allocations or determine a uniquely fair distribution.

• James MirrleesRelated: The optimal tax problem balances redistribution against the welfare costs of distorted choices.

• Normative economicsBroader topic: It makes explicit how individual interests are aggregated into a social objective.

• Liberal paradoxNarrower topic: Sen expresses the paradox as an impossibility for rules aggregating individual rankings.