Linked from

The 18 pages that link to Free-rider problem, each with the reason it gives.

• Collective actionRelated: People may withhold effort when they can share the outcome without helping produce it.

• Public goodsRelated: Non-payers can enjoy a public good, giving each person an incentive to rely on others.

• Extended producer responsibilityRelated: Unregistered producers can avoid fees while benefiting from funded collection systems.

• BoycottRelated: Boycotts can falter when supporters rely on others to bear the costs of abstaining.

• Tragedy of the commonsRelated: Expecting others to conserve can make each user reluctant to limit their own extraction.

• Prisoner's dilemmaRelated: Defection captures the temptation to take the benefit while avoiding the cost of cooperation.

• Coase theoremRelated: Many affected parties can make bargaining costly and difficult to organize.

• CollectivismRelated: Collective aims often depend on contributions that individuals may have incentives to withhold.

• Common ownershipRelated: Shared assets can invite people to take benefits while avoiding maintenance costs.

• Public goods gameRelated: A noncontributor can enjoy the public good funded by others.

• Resource mobilization theoryRelated: It exposes a coordination problem that resource-seeking organizations must address.

• Social dilemmaRelated: The incentive to enjoy the good without paying its costs drives many social dilemmas.

• CommunalismRelated: Communal arrangements must address incentives to take benefits without sharing costs.

• Garrett HardinRelated: Hardin’s logic also applies when users take benefits while avoiding the costs of restraint.

• EgoismRelated: It shows why individually advantageous choices can threaten goods everyone depends on.

• CustomerRelated: Some services have beneficiaries who are not identifiable paying customers.