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The 38 pages that link to Mechanism design, each with the reason it gives.

• Game theoryRelated: It applies strategic analysis in reverse, choosing rules before players act.

• Public goodsRelated: It asks how contribution rules can elicit funding and reveal preferences for shared goods.

• Pareto efficiencyRelated: Designers often seek efficient allocations while respecting incentives and private information.

• Nash equilibriumNarrower topic: Designers often seek rules whose equilibria implement socially desirable outcomes.

• Collective action problemRelated: It asks how rules can align individual choices with collective goals.

• Social choice theoryNarrower topic: It broadens aggregation questions to include incentives and the design of decision procedures.

• Prisoner's dilemmaRelated: It addresses the incentive conflicts illustrated by the dilemma through redesigned rules.

• Free-rider problemRelated: It develops ways to make public-good provision work despite free-riding incentives.

• John NashRelated: Designers use equilibrium analysis to predict how participants respond to proposed rules.

• Auction theoryNarrower topic: Auction theory is a specialized application of this broader design problem.

• Incentive compatibilityNarrower topic: It supplies the framework for constructing rules whose incentives align with intended behavior.

• Mathematical economicsRelated: It applies formal economic reasoning to construct markets, auctions, and allocation rules.

• Resource allocationNarrower topic: It provides tools for designing allocation rules that account for strategic behavior.

• Information economicsNarrower topic: It turns information problems into design questions about contracts, auctions, and allocation rules.

• Law and economicsNarrower topic: It generalizes legal analysis from evaluating rules to designing institutions around strategic behavior.

• Market designNarrower topic: It supplies the theoretical framework for designing markets with strategic participants.

• Bayesian gameRelated: Designers use Bayesian game models to account for participants’ private information.

• Second welfare theoremNarrower topic: When ideal redistribution is unavailable, mechanism design studies alternative ways to pursue efficient outcomes.

• IncentiveRelated: Its central task is to build incentives that produce desired outcomes among strategic participants.

• Perfect informationRelated: Perfect-information models provide a benchmark before private information complicates institutional design.

• Social dilemmaRelated: It asks how rules can make cooperation individually worthwhile.

• Dominant strategyNarrower topic: Designers often seek mechanisms where preferred behavior is dominant rather than dependent on beliefs.

• Leonid HurwiczBroader topic: Hurwicz helped establish this field by formalizing how institutions perform under dispersed information.

• Experimental economicsRelated: Experiments compare how alternative rules perform with real decision-makers.

• Knowledge problemRelated: It asks how institutions can elicit and use information that a central authority lacks.

• Normal-form gameNarrower topic: Designers use strategic-form models to test how rules shape players' incentives.

• Market efficiencyRelated: It asks how institutions can improve outcomes when ordinary market rules fail.

• Gibbard–Satterthwaite theoremNarrower topic: The theorem is a foundational constraint on designing truthful voting mechanisms.

• Eric MaskinNarrower topic: Maskin helped formalize when a mechanism can implement a social choice rule.

• Robert AumannRelated: Aumann’s equilibrium and information frameworks inform analysis of institutional rules.

• Roger MyersonNarrower topic: This is the field whose theory earned Myerson the 2007 Nobel Prize.

• Alvin E. RothNarrower topic: Roth’s market-design practice applies mechanism-design ideas to concrete allocation institutions.

• Public economicsCompared with: It focuses on designing rules under strategic behavior, complementing policy evaluation.

• Constitutional economicsRelated: It shares constitutional economics’ concern with designing rules, often using more formal incentive constraints.

• MicroeconomicsRelated: It applies microeconomic reasoning to the design of auctions, contracts, and regulations.

• William VickreyNarrower topic: Vickrey’s auction work helped establish this field’s central design problem.

• Game (game theory)Related: It works backward from social goals to the game participants will play.

• John Forbes Nash Jr.Related: Nash equilibrium helps predict whether a designed institution achieves its intended outcome.