KnowraMechanism designLinked fromLinked fromThe 38 pages that link to Mechanism design, each with the reason it gives.All 38Broader topic 1Related 20Narrower topic 16Compared with 1Nash equilibriumNarrower topic: Designers often seek rules whose equilibria implement socially desirable outcomes.Social choice theoryNarrower topic: It broadens aggregation questions to include incentives and the design of decision procedures.Auction theoryNarrower topic: Auction theory is a specialized application of this broader design problem.Incentive compatibilityNarrower topic: It supplies the framework for constructing rules whose incentives align with intended behavior.Resource allocationNarrower topic: It provides tools for designing allocation rules that account for strategic behavior.Information economicsNarrower topic: It turns information problems into design questions about contracts, auctions, and allocation rules.Law and economicsNarrower topic: It generalizes legal analysis from evaluating rules to designing institutions around strategic behavior.Market designNarrower topic: It supplies the theoretical framework for designing markets with strategic participants.Second welfare theoremNarrower topic: When ideal redistribution is unavailable, mechanism design studies alternative ways to pursue efficient outcomes.Dominant strategyNarrower topic: Designers often seek mechanisms where preferred behavior is dominant rather than dependent on beliefs.Normal-form gameNarrower topic: Designers use strategic-form models to test how rules shape players' incentives.Gibbard–Satterthwaite theoremNarrower topic: The theorem is a foundational constraint on designing truthful voting mechanisms.Eric MaskinNarrower topic: Maskin helped formalize when a mechanism can implement a social choice rule.Roger MyersonNarrower topic: This is the field whose theory earned Myerson the 2007 Nobel Prize.Alvin E. RothNarrower topic: Roth’s market-design practice applies mechanism-design ideas to concrete allocation institutions.William VickreyNarrower topic: Vickrey’s auction work helped establish this field’s central design problem.
KnowraMechanism designLinked fromLinked fromThe 38 pages that link to Mechanism design, each with the reason it gives.All 38Broader topic 1Related 20Narrower topic 16Compared with 1Nash equilibriumNarrower topic: Designers often seek rules whose equilibria implement socially desirable outcomes.Social choice theoryNarrower topic: It broadens aggregation questions to include incentives and the design of decision procedures.Auction theoryNarrower topic: Auction theory is a specialized application of this broader design problem.Incentive compatibilityNarrower topic: It supplies the framework for constructing rules whose incentives align with intended behavior.Resource allocationNarrower topic: It provides tools for designing allocation rules that account for strategic behavior.Information economicsNarrower topic: It turns information problems into design questions about contracts, auctions, and allocation rules.Law and economicsNarrower topic: It generalizes legal analysis from evaluating rules to designing institutions around strategic behavior.Market designNarrower topic: It supplies the theoretical framework for designing markets with strategic participants.Second welfare theoremNarrower topic: When ideal redistribution is unavailable, mechanism design studies alternative ways to pursue efficient outcomes.Dominant strategyNarrower topic: Designers often seek mechanisms where preferred behavior is dominant rather than dependent on beliefs.Normal-form gameNarrower topic: Designers use strategic-form models to test how rules shape players' incentives.Gibbard–Satterthwaite theoremNarrower topic: The theorem is a foundational constraint on designing truthful voting mechanisms.Eric MaskinNarrower topic: Maskin helped formalize when a mechanism can implement a social choice rule.Roger MyersonNarrower topic: This is the field whose theory earned Myerson the 2007 Nobel Prize.Alvin E. RothNarrower topic: Roth’s market-design practice applies mechanism-design ideas to concrete allocation institutions.William VickreyNarrower topic: Vickrey’s auction work helped establish this field’s central design problem.