Linked from

The 38 pages that link to Moral hazard, each with the reason it gives.

• Principal–agent problemRelated: An agent may take actions that benefit them while imposing costs on the principal.

• Information asymmetryRelated: Hidden actions after an agreement can let one party shift risk onto another.

• Asian financial crisisRelated: Critics argued that expectations of rescue encouraged risky lending and borrowing before the crisis.

• Bank runRelated: Guarantees and rescues can reduce run risk while also changing banks’ and depositors’ incentives.

• InsuranceRelated: Coverage can reduce incentives to prevent losses or affect how much care policyholders take.

• Social insuranceRelated: Benefit rules must protect people without unnecessarily discouraging work or prevention.

• 2008 financial crisisRelated: Rescues prompted debate over whether preventing collapse rewarded reckless financial behavior.

• Lender of last resortRelated: Expected rescue can encourage financial institutions to take greater risks.

• Systemic riskRelated: Expectations of rescue can encourage behavior that increases system-wide vulnerability.

• CrowdfundingRelated: Campaign organizers may have weaker incentives to manage funds carefully when contributors bear losses.

• Deposit insuranceRelated: Insured depositors may monitor banks less, while banks may take greater risks.

• Contract farmingRelated: Buyers and farmers may each have incentives to deviate from agreed terms when actions are difficult to observe.

• Unemployment insuranceRelated: Benefit design can affect incentives to accept work or continue searching.

• Actuarial scienceRelated: Coverage can alter behavior, changing the losses actuarial estimates are meant to price.

• Financial crisisRelated: Expected rescues can encourage risk-taking that increases crisis vulnerability.

• Information economicsRelated: Hidden actions after contracting make insurance and lending incentives difficult to design.

• Flood insuranceRelated: Subsidized or repeated coverage can weaken incentives to avoid risky locations or reduce exposure.

• Joseph StiglitzRelated: His research examined how hidden actions complicate insurance and incentive design.

• Student debtRelated: Debates about loan guarantees ask whether lenders or institutions face too little risk.

• Financial regulationRelated: Guarantees and rescues may stabilize finance while weakening incentives for private risk control.

• BlowbackRelated: Protected local partners may take risks that expose their backers to future costs.

• IncentiveRelated: Protection from consequences can weaken the cost that would otherwise discourage risky choices.

• Unemployment benefitsRelated: Critics examine whether income replacement reduces the urgency of accepting work.

• Ben BernankeRelated: Critics argued that emergency support could encourage future financial risk-taking.

• Universal health careRelated: Insured patients and providers may use more care when payment is separated from use.

• Mexican peso crisisRelated: The rescue prompted debate over whether international support encourages risky borrowing and lending.

• Property insuranceRelated: Coverage can affect how carefully owners protect insured property.

• John HarsanyiRelated: Bayesian models help analyze incentives when actions cannot be fully observed.

• Bengt HolmströmRelated: Holmström studied how hidden actions create moral hazard in insurance and employment.

• Peltzman effectRelated: Insurance-like safety protection can create incentives resembling the Peltzman effect.

• Raghuram RajanRelated: Rajan’s critique of financial incentives centers on institutions expecting others to absorb losses.

• Healthcare policyRelated: Insurance design can alter care use, motivating debates over cost-sharing.