KnowraRent-seekingLinked fromLinked fromThe 21 pages that link to Rent-seeking, each with the reason it gives.All 21Related 17Compared with 4Resource curseRelated: Large resource rents can make control of the state more rewarding than productive enterprise.MonopolyRelated: Firms may spend resources securing or defending monopoly privileges instead of improving output.Import substitution industrializationRelated: Protected firms could lobby to preserve privileges instead of becoming more efficient.Regulatory captureRelated: Industries may invest in lobbying for favorable rules instead of competing solely through products and services.CorruptionCompared with: It describes a broader pursuit of privileged gains, which may or may not involve corruption.Economic nationalismRelated: Protected firms may lobby to preserve advantages instead of improving competitiveness.ProtectionismRelated: Protected firms may spend resources lobbying to preserve barriers instead of improving output.OligarchyRelated: Oligarchic access to decision-makers can convert political privilege into private wealth.Market powerRelated: Firms may spend resources protecting market power instead of improving products or lowering costs.State capitalismRelated: Close ties between officials and firms can reward access over efficiency.Economic rentRelated: Rent can motivate costly lobbying and other attempts to secure exclusive advantages.Public choiceRelated: Groups can spend resources securing policies that transfer benefits to them.State captureCompared with: Rent-seeking describes private actors’ pursuit of favored gains; state capture describes their influence over institutions.Developmental stateCompared with: Selective support can foster investment, but can also reward political access over performance.Infant industry argumentRelated: Protected firms may lobby to preserve tariffs after their promised learning period.Import quotaRelated: Scarce import licenses can motivate competition for politically allocated privileges.DevelopmentalismRelated: Protection and subsidies can invite lobbying for benefits without corresponding productivity gains.Henry George theoremCompared with: The theorem concerns economic land rent, not the politically obtained gains meant by this term.James M. BuchananRelated: Public choice analysis extends Buchanan’s focus on self-interest to competition for political privileges.Constitutional economicsRelated: Institutional constraints can limit the gains available from influencing government decisions.Market interventionRelated: Rules and selective benefits can create incentives to lobby for private gains.
KnowraRent-seekingLinked fromLinked fromThe 21 pages that link to Rent-seeking, each with the reason it gives.All 21Related 17Compared with 4Resource curseRelated: Large resource rents can make control of the state more rewarding than productive enterprise.MonopolyRelated: Firms may spend resources securing or defending monopoly privileges instead of improving output.Import substitution industrializationRelated: Protected firms could lobby to preserve privileges instead of becoming more efficient.Regulatory captureRelated: Industries may invest in lobbying for favorable rules instead of competing solely through products and services.CorruptionCompared with: It describes a broader pursuit of privileged gains, which may or may not involve corruption.Economic nationalismRelated: Protected firms may lobby to preserve advantages instead of improving competitiveness.ProtectionismRelated: Protected firms may spend resources lobbying to preserve barriers instead of improving output.OligarchyRelated: Oligarchic access to decision-makers can convert political privilege into private wealth.Market powerRelated: Firms may spend resources protecting market power instead of improving products or lowering costs.State capitalismRelated: Close ties between officials and firms can reward access over efficiency.Economic rentRelated: Rent can motivate costly lobbying and other attempts to secure exclusive advantages.Public choiceRelated: Groups can spend resources securing policies that transfer benefits to them.State captureCompared with: Rent-seeking describes private actors’ pursuit of favored gains; state capture describes their influence over institutions.Developmental stateCompared with: Selective support can foster investment, but can also reward political access over performance.Infant industry argumentRelated: Protected firms may lobby to preserve tariffs after their promised learning period.Import quotaRelated: Scarce import licenses can motivate competition for politically allocated privileges.DevelopmentalismRelated: Protection and subsidies can invite lobbying for benefits without corresponding productivity gains.Henry George theoremCompared with: The theorem concerns economic land rent, not the politically obtained gains meant by this term.James M. BuchananRelated: Public choice analysis extends Buchanan’s focus on self-interest to competition for political privileges.Constitutional economicsRelated: Institutional constraints can limit the gains available from influencing government decisions.Market interventionRelated: Rules and selective benefits can create incentives to lobby for private gains.