Linked from

The 10 pages that link to Subgame perfect equilibrium, each with the reason it gives.

• Game theoryRelated: It rules out noncredible threats in sequential interactions.

• Game treeRelated: Game trees identify the subgames in which this equilibrium condition must hold.

• Repeated gameRelated: Future threats sustain cooperation only when they remain optimal after every history.

• Perfect informationRelated: Visible histories identify subgames where planned actions must remain credible.

• Extensive-form gameRelated: It rules out plans relying on noncredible threats in later branches.

• Robert AumannRelated: Credible continuation strategies are central to sustaining cooperation over time.

• Folk theoremRelated: Many folk theorems establish sustainable outcomes using this refinement.

• Game (game theory)Related: It rules out plans that rely on noncredible threats in sequential play.